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Schumpeterian Competition and Antitrust
Herbert Hovenkamp *
Joseph Schumpeter’s vision of competition saw it as a
destructive process in which effort, assets and fortunes were
continuously destroyed by innovation. This endless process
displaced older technologies in order to make way for new ones, but
led to economic growth far greater than more stable, conservative
alternatives. 1 Schumpeter’s vision was striking, in sharp contrast
with the conventional neoclassical model of competitive markets,
where the focus was on changes in output and price, relatively
leisurely shifts in consumer tastes, and exceptional strategic
behavior that occasionally dislodged one technology and displaced it
by another. Neoclassical competition is a little like watching the
ocean when it is calm, while Schumpeterian competition is like
watching a raging storm or perhaps even a tidal wave.
As Evans and Hylton so powerfully observe, neoclassical
economics is much more comfortable modeling the relatively stable
situation than the Schumpeterian one. 2 Economists since Alfred
Marshall have observed that the static, partial equilibrium analysis
that dominates industrial economics is readily susceptible to
mathematics, and many of its rather specific propositions are
testable 3 The Schumpeter model may be testable at a very general
level, but probably not in any sense that antitrust policy finds useful.
Schumpeter’s analysis is much too concerned with the mostly
unmanageable realities of the economy as a whole and with largely
unanticipated developments that cannot readily by modeled within
*
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Most famously in Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy (1942), particularly chapter 7, on “The Process of Creative
Destruction.” Some of his argument was anticipated in Joseph A. Schumpeter,
The Theory of Economic Development (1912).
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David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, “The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of
Monopoly Power and its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust.” Competition
Policy, Autumn 2008.
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On this point, see Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 835838 (1954; revised ed, 1984). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neoclassical
Crisis in U.S. Competition Policy, 1890-1955 (SSRN working paper, July, 2008,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156927).
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the equilibrium-searching forces of neoclassical economics.
To be sure, at a fairly general level the contributions that
innovation makes to economic growth can be modeled, and to an
extent the models can be empirically tested. For example, the
neoclassical growth model developed by Robert W. Solow in the
1950s assumed that innovation is an exogenous factor in the
economy, and one can test for its presence and magnitude by
assessing the impact of endogenous factors and then assuming that
the “residual,” or the amount by which growth exceeds these
expectations, must be the result of innovation. 4 For example, it
leads to the testable hypothesis that relatively undeveloped
economies will grow more quickly than developed ones because the
former can borrow innovations from the more developed, while the
latter must develop them internally. By contrast, endogenous growth
models tend to see innovation as growing out of variables that are
within the model of the economy. 5
Today Schumpeter’s conclusion that innovation results much
more from convulsive, unexpected changes than from the gradual
movement of a market toward competitive equilibrium is fairly well
established. What we cannot do, however, is ex ante measurement
of the long run effects of specific innovation efforts. Nor can we
predict the long run impact of some observed practice on innovation,
certainly not in marginal cases. While innovation overall creates an
enormous payoff to society, predicting successful innovations on a
case-by-case basis is a fool’s errand. Testing like that done of
Solow’s neoclassical growth model is entirely ex post, looking back
at the impact of previous innovation in a defined place and time
period. Further, it measures aggregate productivity only.
A very high percentage of innovation programs fail, but the
ones that succeed frequently provide enormous payoffs. And of
course the problem is that ex ante separation is impossible. If we
could predict successful innovations accurately then we could avoid
4

Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70
Q.J.Econ. 65 (1956); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate
production Function, 3 Rev. Econ. Statistics 312 (1957).
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See Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 3
(1994).
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launching the unsuccessful ventures and save enormous resources.
These problems have proven to be significant obstacles for
economic analysis of specific antitrust claims where the question is
likely effects on innovation in the future.
Another problem with measuring innovation or its impact from
an ex ante perspective is that innovation is so badly behaved in
comparison with the ordinary price and output functions of
neoclassical economics. Most changes in price and output are
continuous and related to one another. We know enough about
many types of practices (price fixing, predatory pricing, mergers, etc)
to predict price and output effects. But the consequences of
innovation are often radically indeterminate – sometimes rewarding a
large investment by producing nothing at all, or sometimes by
producing results that were far different than anyone anticipated. 6
The classic example is Viagra, which was the result of a project
seeking treatments for angina. Protracted male erections were
initially regarded by the researchers as an undesirable side effect of
what would later become one of the most successful
pharmaceuticals ever. 7
As Evans and Hylton observe, in antitrust economic analysis
we tend to look at the price and output effects of practices. We
evaluate them by asking whether they tend toward increased or
decreased output, higher or lower prices, or whether they injure
consumers over a testable time period, which is typically quite short.
We do not try to show more, because for the most part we cannot
answer second order questions about long run welfare implications.
In the short run a practice may destroy a rival, produce monopoly,
and may even appear to impair consumer welfare. But in the longer
run it may be part of the very process of creative destruction that
Schumpeter believed to be the bedrock of economic progress. Or to
say it differently, it may be quite easy for an antitrust economist to
predict that a particular exclusionary practice will tend to produce
lower marketwide output and higher prices. But it is very likely
impossible to predict whether some inchoate innovation that is part
6

7

Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 Cardozo L.Rev. 247 (2007).

See id. at 256-257; and Ian H. Osterloh, The Discovery and Development of
Viagra (sildenafil citrate) in Sildenafil 1, 3 (U. Duzendorfer, ed. Burkhäuser Verlag
2004).
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of the monopolist’s scheme might produce long term gains that
greatly outweigh these short term losses.
That argument is difficult to dispute, but it is subject to several
limitations that serve to dilute its importance. Indeed, the observation
may do little more than act as a warning that antitrust economics,
and more importantly federal judges, must keep one wandering eye
on the long run. Here are the qualifiers I would add:
1. We should not confuse the prospect of innovation with the
scope of the intellectual property laws;
2. For many practices positive innovation effects are difficult to
foresee even on Schumpeter’s own expansive and
nonmathematical terms;
3. Many antitrust violations restrain rather than promote
innovation.
On these points.
First, one must never confuse the prospect of innovation with the
scope of the intellectual property laws. While Evans and Hylton are
speaking generally about competition and innovation as
complementary rather than competing products, they refer to this
principle by suggesting that there is “no fundamental tension
between the policies of antitrust law and intellectual property law;
both balance the benefits and costs of static and dynamic
competition for the economy as a whole.” 8 While that might be true
of an economy with ideal competition law and intellectual property
law systems, it is hardly true of the world that we actually live in. In
fact, both the Patent Act and the Copyright Act have produced
bloated regulatory regimes that probably serve to undermine
innovation as often as they promote it, and almost certainly do more
damage to the innovation process than the antitrust laws themselves
do. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the patent system fails to
carry its freight in any market except perhaps chemicals and
pharmaceuticals; 9 and the copyright system has become a
8

Evans and Hylton, “Lawful Acquisition,” note 2 at 3.
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James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges,
Bureaucrats, and Lawyers put Innovators at Risk (2008); and Robert P. Merges,
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playground for special interest groups. 10
Of course, federal judges are not at liberty to rewrite the detailed
patent and copyright codes simply because they believe them to be
badly designed. But the fact is that one cannot infer that if a conflict
appears between competition policy and IP, siding with the latter is
more conducive to further innovation. Further, as noted below, the
antitrust laws may do a better job of furthering innovation than IP
does, provided that it is sufficiently sensitive to the problem of
innovation restraints.
The fact is that in the legal situation we face currently we can
probably do far more to promote innovation by reformulating IP
policy than by reformulating antitrust policy. For example, a more
serious proof of harm requirement could go a long way, perhaps
more in copyright than in patent. If an infringement benefits the
infringer and its customers and causes no harm to the IP holder then
it is a Pareto improvement. Injury should be measured in terms of
the ex ante incentive to create the protected work in the first place. 11
My second point is that for many practices challenged by the
antitrust laws innovation effects are difficult to assess or even
foresee on Schumpeter’s own nonmathematical terms. Not every
antitrust violation has significant implications for innovation. Pricing
practices are a good example. When properly defined, both price
fixing and predatory pricing involve changing the price of a good in
anticompetitive ways. Neither one has obvious implications for
innovation subject to one exception: one can always argue that a
firm will use monopoly profits to innovate more, and that the gains
from the resulting innovation might possibly far exceed the losses
from short-run consumer injuries. But this argument proves too
much and justifies monopoly no matter how created or maintained.

One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 Cal. L.
Rev. 2187, 2336 (2000). Even relative conservatives such as Landes and Posner
find overprotection. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Ch. 1 (2003).
10

Christina Bohannan, Reclaiming Copyright, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 567,
568 (2006).
11

See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability and Fair Use, 85
Washington Univ. L.Rev. 969 (2007).
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On the other hand, if a practice challenged under the antitrust
laws actually furthers innovation, one would expect that the
defendant could provide an explanation and some evidence of this.
For example, if exclusive dealing really is being used to protect the
market for an incipient product then the defendant should be able to
tell us and this information should be incorporated into our rule of
reason analysis.
Finally, the third point is that many antitrust violations restrain
rather than promote innovation. Indeed there are good reasons for
believing that market dominating firms or joint ventures with a
significant investment in their technology are more likely to use
exclusionary practices to restrain the innovations of rivals or potential
rivals than to develop or promote their own innovations. For the
most part, the technology and markets of dominant firms are well
established and they tend to profit from stable growth. By contrast,
the small firm seeking entry must shake up the pot.
Evans and Hylton give the very interesting example borrowed
from the Dentsply case 12 of a firm that develops a new and
innovative but unpatentable tooth. It must then use exclusive dealing
in order to capitalize on its investment by excluding rivals via a
restraint on market access rather than the IP laws. 13 Whether that
story is plausible or not, there is an alternative story that is at least as
plausible. Suppose that a smaller rival has developed an innovative
artificial tooth that may very well be patentable, but success depends
on market access. Further, this artificial tooth threatens to take a
significant share of the market once it is successfully deployed.
Dentsply’s exclusive dealing serves to deny it market access.
In this case the antitrust violation has served to restrain rather
than promote innovation. The story is more plausible than the
Evans/Hylton story for two reasons. First, in this setting market
shifting innovations are more likely to come from smaller firms. Once
it has attained dominance a firm’s interest in creative destruction
12

United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1089 (2006) (condemning exclusive dealing as unlawful
monopolization under §2 of the Sherman Act). See 3B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶768 (3d Ed. 2008).
13

Evans and Hylton, “Lawful Acquisition,” note 2 at 40. [TAN 108].

3-Oct-08

Hovenkamp

7

becomes greatly diminished because it is as likely to be the victim as
the enabler. Indeed, often a firm’s investment in its own technology
creates a form of path dependence. Its vested interests lie much
more in preserving what it has rather than producing a huge market
shifting innovation. Or it tends to innovate in ways that take
advantage of technology and property rights in which it has already
made an investment. By contrast, the smaller rival succeeds by
differentiating its product from that of the dominant firm. 14 Second,
exclusive dealing by a dominant firm is very likely a more effective
means of excluding a smaller rival’s innovation than it is of promoting
the dominant firm’s own innovation. Indeed, Evans and Hylton have
to assume that the IP laws provide no protection in order to make
their story work.
Finally, modeling the incentives to restrain innovation is at
least potentially more tractable than modeling innovation itself,
although measuring long run effects is often just as difficult.
Restraints on innovation typically show up in creation or perpetuation
of monopoly prices, reduced output, and the like. That is, a
dominant firm typically restrains innovation in order to prevent its
market position from eroding. Such gains to the monopolist are
subject to the ordinary measurement tools of forensic economics.
The boycott situation is similar to the vertical exclusion story.
Consider the Allied Tube case, which involved a boycott by the
manufacturers of steel electrical conduit intended to exclude a
market shifting innovation – conduit made from PVC. 15 PVC conduit
was cheaper, easier to work with and did not short out when it came
into contact with an electrical wire. Allied, whose manufacturing
commitment was entirely to steel, plainly foresaw what later became
a market reality: plastic conduit would swamp the field. It therefore
organized a boycott designed to exclude plastic conduit from the
market by writing its use out of municipal building codes.
The Allied Tube story is a particularly easy and obvious one,
14

See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz and S. E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in and
History," 11 J. L., Econ., and Org. 205 (1995); J. Farrell and G. Saloner, Installed
Base and Compatability: Innovation, Product preannouncements, and Predation,
76 Am.Econ.Rev. 940 (1986).
15

Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-497
(1988).
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because PVC conduit was an innovation in its final stages of market
preparation. Its market success was reasonably foreseeable by the
time the antitrust violation occurred. 16 More incipient innovations are
easier for dominant firms to exclude. Further, the violations are more
difficult to detect, and it is certainly more difficult to prove injury.
Consider the pressure that Microsoft placed on Intel to stop its Javaenabled chip R&D program lest Microsoft yank support for future
editions of Windows. 17 Java is a multi-platform processing
language. At the time the Java-enabled chip threatened to make
alternative operating systems “compatible” with Microsoft Windows
by enabling software developers to write software that would operate
on multiple platforms and communicate seamlessly with one another.
By excluding Java Microsoft stood to gain the higher market share
and prices that resulted from suppressing innovative competition that
threatened to make Windows one of many alternative platforms.
Consumers lost uncertain value, depending on the likelihood that the
chip would have succeeded and its market impact. Or consider the
many, many cases involving Walker Process style patent
infringement lawsuits based on improperly obtained patents or on
irrationally broad patent claims. 18 Many of these are lawsuits
brought by large firms with a heavy investment in their existing
technology, designed to oust the innovative technology of a less well
financed rival.
In sum, one place the antitrust laws could be more aggressive
than they are today is when the stars are in alignment. An important
corollary of the premise that innovation contributes much more to
16

For a similar story, see Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456
U.S. 556 (1982), which involved an agreement among the members of an
accreditation association to suppress a superior valve technology, with the result
that the plaintiff’s valve could not be marketed. See 13 Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law ¶2115 (2d ed. 2005).
17

See Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, note 6, 29 Cardozo L.Rev. at
249-250 (discussing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29
(D.D.C. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, but affirmed on this issue, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001)).
18

Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965). See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶706 (3d ed.
2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Walker Process Doctrine: Infringement Lawsuits
as Antitrust Violations (SSRN working paper, Sep. 2008, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1259877).
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economic growth than does price competition and short run
efficiency, is that a restraint on innovation can do much more harm.
Restraints such as the ones at issue in Allied Tube and Microsoft
simultaneously produce higher prices in the dominant firm’s market
and loss of innovation in incipient markets that are delayed or not
permitted to materialize.
The obvious question that raises is When is an antitrust
violation more likely to be innovation enhancing rather than
innovation restraining? While that question may be very difficult to
answer in some cases, in others it appears not to be. For example,
where a dominant firm is using an exclusionary practice to protect its
established investment from an incipient technology harm to
innovation seems the most likely outcome.
The most difficult set of cases is likely to involve joint ventures
and at least some mergers, where the dangers of collusion must be
set against the very real possibilities that the union will promote
significant innovation. Standard setting is another area. The
potential cost savings from reliable standards can be enormous, but
the process can be used to exclude novel technologies. For
example, the Hydrolevel case involved a situation where a standard
setting committee within the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers was manipulated into denying approval, and thus market
access, to the plaintiff’s innovative valve when the dominant firm
perceived a market threat. 19
It is also worth noting that restraints on innovation can be
addressed under both antitrust policy and a properly formulated IP
policy. For example, the doctrine of patent or copyright “misuse” can
be a device for combating contractual devices or overly broad claims
by IP holders that tend to restrain rival innovations. But misuse
claims apply only against IP holders, and typically only in defenses
against infringement lawsuits. 20 The restraints at issue in cases like
19

Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). See
also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-497
(1988).
20

See 10 Phillip E. Areeda, Einer Elhauge, and Herbert Hovenkamp ¶1781 (2d
ed. 2004); Christina Bohannan, Intellectual Property Misuse and Foreclosure
(2008).
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Allied Tube and Microsoft did not involve firms acting as IP holders
but rather as market participants with considerable leverage over
others and existing technologies that they wished to protect.
An increased antitrust concern with restraints on innovation
places a premium on government enforcement for the very reason
that Evans and Hylton suggest: economic proof of the effects of
restraints on innovation is so difficult to obtain, thus making proof of
private injury and damages very difficult. A case in point is the
tagalong litigation in Kloth v. Microsoft, where the Fourth Circuit
ulimtately held that private plaintiffs could not obtain damages for
Microsoft’s suppression of Intel’s Java chip program because they
were too speculative. As the court observed, “It would be entirely
speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial proceeding to
create in hindsight a technological universe that never came into
existence. . . . 21 While private plaintiffs must show causation and
actual injury for damages or threatened injury for an injunction, the
United States or Federal Trade Commission acting as enforcer need
show only that the antitrust laws have been violated. 22
CONCLUSION
Schumpeter was correct that over the long run the gains from
innovation dwarf the gains from government intervention to make the
economy more competitive under the traditional criteria of price and
output. It follows that the losses resulting from restraints on
innovation could be very large as well. The problem of ex ante
measurement of the social losses that result from a restraint on an
undeveloped innovation are equivalent to the problem of ex ante
measurement of the gains that the innovation would have produced
had the innovation process been permitted to run its course. In both
cases an ex ante assessment could be virtually impossible and in
any case would be highly speculative.
But that does not necessarily mean that antitrust cannot do
anything about the problem. In some cases, all that is necessary is
to consider short run consequences for competition and ignore
21

Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 323 (4th Cir. 2006); see Hovenkamp,
Restraints on Innovation, note 6, 29 Cardozo L.Rev. at 259.
22

See 2 & 2A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶303,
326 (3d ed. 2007).
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innovation possibilities that are too remote to see. In other cases
one should consider whether an innovation or a restraint on
innovation is the more likely outcome. The likelihood that a practice
furthers innovation should serve to weaken or perhaps even
undermine the antitrust concern. By contrast, the likelihood that a
practice restrains innovation should deserve a much closer look.

